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SHOULD INDIGENT CIVIL LITIGANTS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS HAVE A RIGHT TO
APPOINTED COUNSEL?
LUTHER At. SWYGERT* **
The problem of providing legal assistance for the poor has a long
history.' Currently, indigent civil litigants receive free legal services
from publicly and privately funded legal aid programs and from at-
torneys in private practice. Those sources, however, have proven inade-
quate to meet the existing need.2 Recently, the Reagan Administration
proposed that Congress eliminate federal funding for the Legal Services
Corporation (L.S.C.)3 Congress did not adopt the proposal, but it did cut
the funding for L.S.C. by twenty-five percent for the fiscal year 1982.1
Given the acknowledged need for the provision of legal services to in-
digent litigants, the question arises whether the government has an
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. LL.B. 1927,
the University of Notre Dame. Judge Swygert was a judge-in-residence at the Frances
Lewis Law Center, School of Law, Washington and Lee University, during October 1981
and March-April 1982. As such, he devoted his time to the research and writing of this arti-
cle.
** I am indebted to my law clerk, Barbara E. Rook, for her invaluable assistance in the
research and writing of this article.
' See text accompanying notes 20-39 infra.
2 See Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REV.
651, 656 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein]; LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ANNUAL
REPORT 18 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL SERVICES REPORT]. The Legal Services Cor-
poration (L.S.C.) has estimated that in 1981, prior to the reduction in appropriations, it
handled 1.5 million cases, which was "[a]t best .... less than 20 percent of actual need."
LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra, at 18.
See Reagan Proposals Detail Further Trims in Budget, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1981, §
B, at 5. The Legal Services Corporation is an independent, federally funded program that
Congress created in 1974. The Legal Services Corporation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat.
378 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-2996k (1977)). Congress found that "there is a need
to provide equal access to the system of justice in our Nation for individuals who seek
redress of grievances" and that "providing legal assistance to those who face an economic
barrier to adequate legal counsel will serve best the ends of justice." 42 U.S.C. § 2996(1), (3).
Prior to the creation of the L.S.C., federally funded legal services for the poor were provided
by the Legal Services Program, which was part of the Office of Economic Opportunity. For
a brief history of federally funded legal aid programs, see Stashower, A Brief History of
Legal Services: 10 on the Richter Scale, 38 NLADA BRIEFCASE 18 (1981); Comment, Presi-
dent Reagan and the Legal Services Corporation, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 711, 711-21 (1982).
' See LEGAL SERVICES REPORT, supra note 2, at 7. Pub. L. No. 97-92, which the House
passed on December 10, 1981, 127 CONG. REC. H9156 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1981), and the Senate
on December 11, 1981, 127 CONG. REC. S15,063 (Dec. 11, 1981), provided the L.S.C. $241
million for fiscal year 1982. In fiscal year 1981, the L.S.C. received $321 million, and it re-
quested $400 million for fiscal year 1982. See H.R. REP. No. 97-97, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1981).
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obligation to furnish counsel to all such litigants for whom free legal ser-
vices are not available. This article will focus on one aspect of the
broader problem: the appointment of counsel by federal courts for in-
digent plaintiffs in civil rights cases and for indigent petitioners in
habeas corpus proceedings. The constitutional basis for such appoint-
ments will first be discussed, and then the practical alternatives, such as
the present rules and practice of the federal courts and the efforts of the
organized bar to furnish pro "bono publico assistance, will be surveyed.
The courts have long recognized the importance of access to the
courts as a means of resolving disputes and vindicating rights. In Boddie
v. Connecticut,5 Justice Harlan wrote:
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society
is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a
system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its
members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitely
settle their differences in an orderly and predictable manner.
Without such a "legal system," social organization and cohesion
are virtually impossible . . . . It is to courts, or other quasi-
judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implemen-
tation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement.'
In many cases, a court of law is the only forum available to someone
seeking to protect his rights or resolve a dispute.'
In criminal cases, the sixth amendment gives the accused in federal
court the right to be represented by counsel,8 and the Supreme Court
has interpreted this guarantee to include the right to court-appointed
counsel if the defendant is too poor to retain counsel.' In civil cases, a
federal statute gives parties the right to be represented by counsel,'"
5 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Id. at 374-75.
See id. at 376-77. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). In Button, the
Court explained that litigation may sometimes take on a broader role in the quest for the
protection of civil rights:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of
treatment by all governments, federal, state and local, for the members of the
Negro community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups
which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot fre-
quently turn to the courts. Just as it was true of the opponents of New Deal
legislation during the 1930's, for example, no less is it true of the Negro minority
today. And under the conditions of modern government, litigation may well be the
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.
Id. at 429-30 (footnotes omitted).
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
' See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938); text accompanying notes 52-54 infra
(discussion of Johnson). See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
,o See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1977). In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court
stated that "[i]f in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to
refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not
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and another statute gives federal courts the power to request counsel to
represent 'an indigent litigant,1 but this power is discretionary only.12
"There is no constitutional or statutory right for an indigent to have
counsel appointed in a civil case."
13
The courts have acknowledged, in the context of criminal cases, that
the due process right to be heard in court may not be meaningful if the
defendant is not represented by counsel." There can be no doubt about
the importance of effective assistance of counsel. The defense against a
criminal charge or the establishment of a substantive right in a civil pro-
ceeding often depends upon how the case is presented. Laymen are not
usually competent to try their own cases. In speaking about the inability
of an accused to defend himself without the aid of counsel, Justice
Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama defined that deficiency in language
that defies improvement:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence ir-
relevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that
be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ig-
norant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.'5
Justice Sutherland's statement is equally applicable to civil litigation. In-
deed, the factual and legal issues in a civil case are ordinarily more com-
plex than in a criminal prosecution," although admittedly more is at
stake in the latter situation.
be doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process
in the constitutional sense." 287 U.S. at 69. But the Court in a later case emphasized that
this was dicta and refused to find a constitutional right of counsel for a civil litigant. See
Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 n. 15 (1975). But see 419 U.S. at 471 (Stewart, J., con-
curring in the result) ("More-than 40 years ago the Court recognized a due process right to
retained counsel in civil proceedings.").
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1977).
" See United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965).
Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980).
" See text accompanying notes 47-60 infra.
,I 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
" See Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 548
(1967) [hereinafter cited as The Indigent's Right to Counsel.
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The need to be represented by counsel takes on even greater
significance when considered in the context of our adversary legal
system. One of the underlying assumptions of the adversary system is
that both parties will have access to at least minimal legal resources.
This assumption is destroyed when one of the parties is not represented
by counsel. 7 Not only is the pro se litigant at a disadvantage at trial, but
perhaps more importantly, he is severely handicapped even before he
gets to court. In civil cases, the unrepresented party may be overwhelmed
by discovery requests and pretrial motions. His inability to respond ade-
quately may result in a judgment against him. Further, the
unrepresented party may be unable to settle his claim with the opposing
party as long as his opponent has the advantage if the case goes to
court.8
It is my contention that indigent plaintiffs in some civil actions have
the right to appointed counsel. As I shall develop below, I believe that
fundamental principles of due process and equal protection, stated by
the Supreme Court, support this conclusion. 9 Moreover, recognition of
such a right is consistent with the common-law tradition of the Anglo-
American judicial system. Therefore, before discussing the constitu-
tional basis for the appointment of counsel in civil cases, I shall first
review briefly the development of the right to counsel in civil cases in
England.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASES IN ENGLAND
A. The Indigent Civil Litigant's Right to Appointed Counsel at
Common Law
In England, the right of indigent civil litigants to government-
provided counsel dates back to the ninth century." The English
historical record indicates, however, that this right was founded more in
rhetoric and statute than in actual practice.
Before 1495, indigents' access to the civil courts and representation
by lawyers was limited to the practice of ecclesiastical lawyers to repre-
sent poor people in the temporal courts,2' and royal perogative. By the
time of Henry III (1216-1272), it was an accepted practice for the king to
send his personal emissaries to right wrongs that the ordinary courts
did not or could not correct." This was particularly true after the fee
" See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 826 (1977) ("Even the most dedicated trial judges
are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation.").
"' See Schmertz, The Indigent Civil Plaintiff in the District of Columbia: Facts and
Commentary, 27 FED. B. J. 235, 243 (1967).
19 See text accompanying notes 61-150 infra.
See Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 362, 365 (1923)
[hereinafter cited as Maguire].
" See id. at 364-66.
See id.
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system was instituted in the common law courts.? The king's emissaries
often heard complaints of poor people who could not pay court or at-
torney fees or who believed that the common law courts were biased
against them. "In 1476 'one John Brown was present to be the
presignator of the poor in the Common Pleas ... and it was said that if
any poor man would swear to him that he was not able to pay for the en-
try of pleas ... then he ought to enter the pleas without taking anything
for his labor.... ,, One plaintiff sought relief in the king's court
because she "'can get no justice at all, seeing that she is poor and this
Thomas is rich.' ".
This aspect of the royal perogative was maintained throughout the
institutionalization of the legal system, and Chancery continued the
practice." One ground of Star Chamber jurisdiction was the poverty of
the plaintiff.' The Court of Requests was known originally as the Court
of Poor Men's Causes.' These institutions were, however, imperfect pro-
viders of justice to the poor, in part because the royal courts met infre-
quently and were slow to reach results.' Further, over time they
became laden with technical and legalistic obstacles too complex for the
poor to surmount."
Nevertheless, perhaps the disparity between indigent access to the
royal courts and to the law courts explains the seminal 1495 statute,
which permitted the poor to sue in the law courts "in forma pauperis."'
The statute, which remained in effect until 1883, empowered the
chancellor to assign lawyers to indigent civil plaintiffs
without any reward taking therefore; and after the said writ or
writs be returned, if it be afore the King in his bench, the
justices there shall assign to the same poor person or persons,
counsel learned, by their discretions, which shall give their
counsels, nothing taking for the same; and likewise the justices
shall appoint attorney and attornies for the same poor person or
persons, and all other officers requisite and necessary to be had
for the speed of the said suits to be had and made, which shall do
their duties without any reward for their counsels, help and
business in the same ... [and the same shall be done in other
courts of record].,2
' See id.
"Id. at 366 (quoting Y.B. 15 Edw. IV 26b).
= Maguire, supra note 20, at 367 (quoting 30 Seld. Soc. 3 (1914)).
Maguire, supra note 20, at 368.
" See id. at 369.
" See 12 Seld. Soc. 21, xii (1898).
" See Maguire, supra note 20, at 371.
See id. at 371-72.
' 11 Hen. 7, c. 12 (1495).
Id., quoted in Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 735, 741 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro].
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The 1495 statute had a variety of shortcomings. First, it did not apply
to civil defendants." In addition, it did not exempt the pauper from pay-
ing court costs. 4 If the pauper lost and could not pay the prevailing party's
costs (including attorney's fees), he could be whipped. 5 Also, there was
no provision of legal aid for appeals. Finally, the courts required the in-
digent to produce a certificate signed by two attorneys attesting to the
good cause of the suit.36
Even if an indigent civil plaintiff gained access to the courts, judges
rarely exercised their power to appoint counsel. Aside from the
serjeants-at-law, who were officers of the court in the truest sense, there
was substantial doubt about a judge's power to compel an unwilling
private lawyer to donate his services." While the basis of objections by
See Maguire, supra note 20, at 377; Shapiro, supra note 32, at 745.
See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 745.
See id.; Maguire, supra note 20, at 375.
See Shapiro, supra note 32, at 745.
17 See id. at 746-49.
1 See id. at 746-47. Professor Shapiro found only one reported case, from Ireland, in
which a lawyer objected to the pro bono assignment, but the exchange between the lawyer
and the trial judge reveals the prevailing attitudes towards the lawyer's duty:
Macmeehan [the counsel asked by the court to serve] replied that he had no
objection personally to act, but there was a feeling and opinion existing on the
subject among the bar which compelled him to beg that his lordship would excuse
him for declining.
Sir Thomas Staples, Q.C., rose and addressed the court. He said that on the
part of the bar he thought it right to state that there was a feeling among them in
which he quite concurred, that no counsel could, with propriety, undertake the
defense of a prisoner without receiving instructions from an attorney. He also had
to say, not on the part of Mr. Macmeehan, but on the part of the bar, that in every
case in which counsel was assigned, the Crown should pay him a fee; up to a very
recent period it was a rule to do so.
PIGOTT, C.B., said he could make no rule upon the subject of payment of
counsels' fee in such cases; but he would certainly recommend that it should be
paid by the Crown, and it was his own opinion that the fee ought to be paid. With
respect to the assignment of counsel and attorney for a prisoner, it was his opinion
that a judge might with propriety call on a barrister to give his honorary services
to a prisoner who was unable to employ one; but he thought the case different as
regarded an attorney. A case occurred at the Special Commission in Clonmel,
before himself and the Lord Chief Justice (Reg. v. Cody), in which an attorney had
been paid for certain services, and refused to act further without receiving fur-
ther renumeration; the Chief Justice and himself were of opinion that they had no
power to compel him to do so, but they called upon Mr. Roleston to defend the
prisoners, and he consented to do so without the assistance of an attorney; and,
after as able a defense as ever he (the Chief Baron) had heard in a court of justice,
the prisoners were convicted.
Macmeehan said he entertained a great respect for Mr. Roleston but he
dissented from the propriety of the course taken by him. Perrin, J. had expressed
a decided opinion that counsel ought not to act without an attorney.
PIGOTT, C.B., said he could not compel counsel to act; he could do no more
than appeal to the sense of feeling of the bar.
Murphy (solicitor) having consented to act as attorney for the prisoner,
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lawyers to representation of the poor was clearly pecuniary, the failure
of the English judiciary to enforce the letter and spirit of the 1495
statute was problematic. Class antagonism may have played some part,
but the English trial judges were also concerned about abuses by bad-
faith claimants and had an understandable opposition to a greatly in-
creased workload.
3 9
B. The Current British System
In contrast to both its historical roots and the American system, the
modern British legal aid system, established in 1949, is a model of in-
telligent delivery of legal services to the poor.4 A poor person obtains
legal counsel by contacting any private lawyer whose name appears on a
legal aid list. Because most lawyers volunteer their services, a poor per-
son has almost as broad a range of choice as any other person seeking
legal advice.4' A screening committee of private lawyers certifies the
case based upon its potential merit and upon whether "'a man of
moderate means ... would embark on [this] litigation.' ",42 An appeal may
be taken from a denial of certification. If the case is certified, the
government's legal aid fund pays all litigation costs, generally including
100 percent of the opposing party's costs if he prevails, and 90 percent of
the lawyer's fees.44 Applicant contribution to the cost of representation
is assessed in proportion to the applicant's means.45
Macmeehan consented to act as counsel.
Regina v. Fogarty, 5 Cox's Crim. Cases. 161, 161-62 (Crown Ct., County Down 1851), quoted
in Shapiro, supra note 32, at 747-48.
See Maguire, supra note 20, at 378.
,o See Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 51; Legal Aid Act, 1960,
8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 28.
" See Upton, The British Legal Aid System, 76 YALE L.J. 371, 373 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Upton].
See id. at 372 (quoting E. SACHS, LEGAL AID 82 (1951)).
, See Upton, supra note 41, at 372. The British position that a denial of a request for
counsel is appealable immediately is in marked contrast to the law in the Seventh Circuit. In
Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981), the court held that a mo-
tion denying the discretionary appointment of counsel in a civil action under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d) (1977) was not immediately appealable, but could be reviewed only after entry of a
final judgment. In my dissent, I discussed the problems facing a pro se litigant and argued
that the denial of a motion to appoint counsel was not effectively reviewable on appeal from
the final judgment. I concluded that the possible harm from the erroneous denial of court-
appointed counsel, including voluntary dismissal by a plaintiff who feels incapable of pursu-
ing the case on his own or settlement on disadvantageous terms, justified an exception to
the general rule that appeals may be taken only from final judgments. See 664 F.2d at 1068.
The Seventh Circuit is currently in the minority on this issue; only the Tenth Circuit has
taken a similar position. See Cotner v. U.S. Probation Officer Mason, 657 F.2d 1390, 1391-92
(10th Cir. 1981). Four other circuits disagree. See Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir.
1981); Hudak v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.
1977); Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 284 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964 (1962).
" See Upton, supra note 41, at 372.
,5 See id. at 373.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. The Sixth Amendment
The sixth amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense."46 In 1932, the Supreme Court held in Powell v.
Alabama" that the sixth amendment applied to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.48 After Powell,
therefore, it was clear that defendants in both state and federal criminal
proceedings were constitutionally entitled to be represented by counsel.
Powell also established that, at least in some cases, an indigent defen-
dant was entitled to have counsel appointed for him. The Court stated
that "in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel,
and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ig-
norance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary
requisite of due process of law."'49 In Avery v. Alabama," another capital
case, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Powell."
In Johnson v. Zerbst,52 the Court apparently broadened the holding
of Powell by implying that ignorance, feeble-mindedness, or illiteracy
are not prerequisites to a defendant's constitutional right to appointed
counsel. Justice Black, writing for the Court, stated:
The Sixth Amendment embodies a realistic recognition of the ob-
vious truth that the average defendant does not have the profes-
sional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the pro-
secution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. That
which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the un-
trained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysterious. 3
Although Johnson involved a federal conviction, the sixth amendment
principles enunciated by the Court in that case would apply to state pro-
secutions under the holding of Powell.4
The Supreme Court, however, halted the trend toward recognition
of a right to appointed counsel in all state and federal prosecutions in its
46 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
4 Id. at 66-68.
' Id. at 71.
10 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
51 Id. at 446.
2 304 U.S. 458 (1939). Avery and Powell involved state convictions for capital crimes,
while Johnson involved a federal conviction for counterfeiting.
Id. at 462-63.
287 U.S. at 66-68.
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decision in Betts v. Brady.5  The Betts Court held that although "the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of
one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental idea of
fairness," the amendment does not embody "an inexorable command
that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel."56
Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Court overruled the Betts
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.5' In Gideon, the Court held that the
state must secure appointed counsel for every indigent felony defendant
unless the defendant competently and intelligently waives the right.
Justice Black wrote:
[A]ny person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer,
cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state
and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to
establish machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers
to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the
public's 'interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there are few
defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the
best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest in-
dications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts
are necessities, not luxuries. 8
Then in 1972, in Argersinger v. Hamlin9 the Court held that the right to
appointed counsel extends equally to defendants tried and imprisoned
for petty crimes and misdemeanors."
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not
permit imprisonment of an indigent defendant who was not represented
by counsel, the Court has yet to consider whether, and under what cir-
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
" Id. at 473.
5 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" Id. at 344.
5' 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id. at 31. The right to counsel may be implicated whenever a criminal defendant is
subject to adversarial proceedings, see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972), and the
right applies to all stages of a prosecution, see Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
382-83 (1967). See also Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133-36 (1968) (parole hearing); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-32 (1967) (post-indictment line-up); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam) (preliminary hearing); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54
(1961) (arraignment). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979) (the mere possibility of
a prison sentence is not enough; no appointed counsel necessary where prison term is an
authorized penalty but is not actually imposed); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,130-32 (1975)
(no counsel for post-arrest probable cause hearing); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790-91
(no counsel for parole revocation).
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cumstances, the Constitution requires appointed counsel for an indigent
civil litigant. Some of the Court's prior decisions under the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses support my contention that such a right is
constitutionally guaranteed.
B. The Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the
due process clause of the fifth amendment require that a governmental
classification that impinges on a fundamental right61 or is premised on a
suspect criterion"2 , such as race or national origin, will be subjected to
strict scrutiny review and struck down unless it is "necessary to pro-
mote a compelling governmental interest."63 Classifications that neither
affect a suspect class nor implicate a fundamental right will be sustained
if "rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest." 4 As a prac-
tical matter, under this two-tier system of review, the classification will
be upheld unless strict scrutiny is applied. 5 Failure to provide counsel to
indigent civil litigants constitutes a governmental classification requir-
ing equal protection analysis. This classification arguably is subject to
strict scrutiny review both because it affects a suspect class-the
poor-and because it limits a fundamental right,- meaningful access to
the courts.
1. Wealth as a Suspect Criterion
The language of some Supreme Court cases seemed to support the
characterization of wealth as one of the suspect criteria, like race and na-
tional origin. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,66 the Court in dic-
tum stated that "[lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like
those of race .. ., are traditionally disfavored. 16 Even stronger wording,
although also dictum, appeared a year later in McDonald v. Board of
" E.g. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
02 E.g. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in original).
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973).
See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("So far
as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this ['compelling state interest'] standard ...").
There is, however, an intermediate standard of review that the Court has applied to
classifications based on gender. To survive a challenge under the equal protection clause,
"classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of these objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976). Under this standard, the Court has found many gender-based classifications un-
constitutional. Id.; Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
(1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977).
383 U.S. 663 (1966).
0" Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
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Election Commissioners: "[A] careful examination on our part is
especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or
race .... two factors which would independently render a classification
highly suspect and therefore demand a more exacting judicial
scrutiny." 9
Despite this seemingly conclusive language, recent equal protection
opinions make it clear that the present Court does not consider
classifications based on wealth to be suspect. In United States v. Kras,"
the Court held that a statute requiring payment of filing fees for
bankruptcy petitions "does not touch upon what have been said to be the
suspect criteria of race, nationality, or alienage."7' The Court reaffirmed
its position on weath classifications in Ortwein v. Schwab.71 In both of
these cases the Court required only a rational basis to justify wealth
classifications and in both upheld the classification at issue."
2. Access to the Courts as a Fundamental Interest
The Supreme Court also will apply the strict scrutiny standard to
classifications involving what the Court perceives to be "fundamental"
interests. The line of cases supporting this analysis began in 1942 with
Skinner v. Oklahoma.74 In Skinner, the state statute at issue permitted
the state to sterilize certain "habitual criminals." In deciding to review
the statutory classification under strict scrutiny, the Court emphasized
that the right at issue was "one of the basic civil rights of man."75
Some fundamental interests that trigger strict scrutiny review, in-
cluding voting76 and access to appellate review of criminal convictions,
7
are interests that the Constitution does not protect directly.78 For exam-
ple, states have discretion to appoint many officials rather than to elect
them,' 9 and the United States Constitution does not require the states to
394 U.S. 802 (1969).
" Id. at 807 (citation omitted). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-69
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The criterion of 'wealth' apparently was added to the list of
'suspects' as an alternative justification for the rationale in Harper ...."). The language in
Harper and McDonald was merely dicta, because in both cases the Court was dealing with
classifications that allegedly infringed on voting, which the Court held was a fundamental
right and on that basis deserving of strict scrutiny review. See Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 U.S. at 667; McDonald v. Board of Education Comm'rs, 394 U.S. at 807.
,' 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
" Id. at 446.
72 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam).
7 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. at 446; Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. at 660.
' 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
,' Id. at 541.
" See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
" See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
71 Classifications that infringe on the exercise of constitutional rights also get strict
scrutiny review. See, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (first
amendment); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate.travel).
", See Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967).
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provide appellate review." This branch of equal protection analysis re-
quires, however, that if governments undertake to provide these rights,
they may not do so in a discriminatory manner.
The Supreme Court first held that access to the courts in criminal
cases is a fundamental interest in Griffin v. Illinois."' Illinois law provided
that all convicted persons had the right to appeal their convictions. In
order to get full appellate review, however, the defendant had to furnish
the court with a bill of exceptions or a report of the trial proceedings,
and a defendant could not prepare either of these documents without a
trial transcript.12 The defendants in Griffin petitioned the trial court for
a free transcript because they were "poor persons with no means of pay-
ing the necessary fees to acquire the Transcript and Court Records
needed to prosecute an appeal."83 After the trial court denied their re-
quest, the defendants unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief in
state court.
Justice Black, writing for a plurality in Griffin, began by noting that
"[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is
an age-old problem."84 After discussing the importance of appellate
review in the criminal justice system, Justice Black concluded: "There
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the
amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as ade-
quate appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy
transcripts.
8 5
The Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Griffin in Douglas v.
California"8 to require appointed counsel for indigent criminal defen-
dants for the first appeal as of right. Speaking for the Court, Justice
Douglas found that although the equal protection clause does not de-
mand "absolute equality," nevertheless, "where the merits of the one
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of
counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich
and poor."87 Later decisions, based on the equal protection analysis of
Griffin and Douglas, have established that the states must provide in-
digent defendants free trial transcripts or the equivalent" in appeals
See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
" 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 13.
8, Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
8' 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
" Id. at 357 (emphasis omitted).
In Griffin, the Court stated that the state need not always provide an indigent with
a complete stenographer's transcript if another available method would provide "adequate
and effective appellate review." 351 U.S. at 20. Accord, Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487,
495 (1963) (other methods are "permissible if they place before the appellate court an
equivalent report of the events at trial from which the appellant's contentions arise.").
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from misdemeanor convictions89 and habeas corpus proceedings, free
transcripts of preliminary hearings," waiver of filing fees for appeals,
even discretionary review procedures,92 post-conviction relief," and ap-
peals from denial of post-conviction writs. 4
The reasoning of Griffin and Douglas applies equally to indigent civil
litigants, as some members of the Court have acknowledged. Justice
Douglas, concurring in Boddie v. Connecticut,9 5 argued that the Griffin
analysis should be applied to a case in which indigents were denied ac-
cess to divorce court because of their inability to pay filing fees. Justice
Brennan, in a separate concurring opinion, agreed:
The rationale of Griffin covers the present case. Courts are the
central dispute-settling institutions in our society. They are
bound to do equal justice under the law, to rich and poor alike.
They fail to perform their function in accordance with the Equal
Protection Clause if they shut their doors to indigent plaintiffs
altogether. Where money determines not merely "the kind of
trial a man gets,".., but whether he gets into a court at all, the
great principle of equal protection becomes a mockery. A State
may not make its judicial processes available to some but deny
them to others simply because they cannot pay a fee.9
" Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). In Mayer, the Court stated that "[lthe size of
the defendant's pocketbook bears no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a
nonfelony than in a felony case." Id. at 196. In applying Griffin, the Mayer Court found that
Griffin does not represent a balance between the needs of the accused and the in-
terests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition against pricing indigent defen-
dants out of as effective an appeal as would be available to others able to pay their
own way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that exists when criminal pro-
cedures are made available only to those who can pay is not erased by any dif-
ferences in the sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal interest is,
therefore, irrelevant.
Id. at 196-97.
Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 194 (1966).
' Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (per curiam).
' Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959).
,3 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) ("We hold that to interpose any financial
consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to
sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws.").
" Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484 (1963).
'5 401 U.S. 371, 383 (Douglas, J., concurring).
" Id. at 383.
" Id. at 388-89 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). In Williams, a poor tenant was re-
quired to post bond in order to contest an eviction proceeding. Because the tenant could not
pay the bond, he was summarily evicted. The tenant challenged the bond requirement
under the equal protection clause, but the state supreme court held that the eviction
rendered the case moot. Justice Douglas, jojned by Chief Justice Warren, stated that "[o]n
numerous occasions this Court has struck down financial limitations on the ability to obtain
judicial review." 385 U.S. at 1039. Justice Douglas referred to Griffin and its progeny and
continued:
It i-true that these cases have dealt with criminal proceedings. But the Equal
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I believe that access to the courts for the purpose of protecting con-
stitutional and other important civil rights should be included in that
category of fundamental interests that trigger strict scrutiny review.
The pursuit of justice, whatever that term may mean to different people,
is a basic value in American society, and equal access to the courts is
critical to the struggle for justice. In civil as well as criminal cases, to
paraphrase Griffin, the kind of justice a person receives should not de-
pend upon the amount of money he or she has.
My own view of the requirements of the equal protection clause not-
withstanding, some recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that
classifications which restrict equal access to civil courts will not trigger
a strict scrutiny review. In Ross v. Moffitt, 8 the Court refused to apply
Douglas to require a state court to appoint counsel for an indigent seek-
ing discretionary review in the state supreme court. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, recognized that "a skilled lawyer ... would ...
prove helpful to any litigant able to employ him," but concluded that
equal protection does not require the government "to duplicate the legal
arsenal that may be privately retained."99
Other indications of the Court's disinclination to characterize access
to the courts as a. fundamental interest are the recent decisions refusing
to include housing,10 education,'' and welfare benefits" 2 as fundamental
interests under the equal protection clause. In San Antonio School
District v. Rodriguez,1'3 the Court discussed the problem of deciding
whether to consider a right fundamental so as to trigger strict scrutiny
review:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitu-
tional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. Thus, the key to discovering whether [ right] is "fun-
damental" ... lies in assessing whether [the right] ... is explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."4
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to criminal pro-
secutions. Its protections extend as well to civil matters.
... This Court of course does not sit.to cure social ills that beset the country. But
when we are faced with a statute that apparently violates the Equal Protection
Clause by patently discriminating against the poor and thereby worsening their
already sorry plight, we should address ourselves to it.
385 U.S. at 1039-41.
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
" Id. at 616. I cannot agree that appointing a lawyer to represent an indigent litigant
is equivalent to "duplicating the legal arsenal" that a wealthy litigant could employ.
10 Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
1" San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
'°0 Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
"' 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
"4 Id. at 33-34.
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There is a line of Supreme Court cases suggesting that access to the
courts is an independently protected constitutional right. In Johnson v.
Avery,' the Court struck down a prison regulation that prohibited in-
mates from assisting each other in legal matters such as drafting peti-
tions for writs of habeas corpus. In the majority opinion, Justice Fortas
emphasized "the fundamental importance of the writ of habeas corpus in
our constitutional scheme,""' 6 and concluded: "Since the basic purpose of
the writ is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their
freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts for the
purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or
obstructed."'' 7 In Wolff v. McDonnell,"8 the Court extended the Avery
holding to civil rights actions:
The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised,
is founded in the Due Process clause and assures that no person
will be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allega-
tions concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights.
It is futile to contend that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 has less
importance in our constitutional scheme than does the Great
Writ. The recognition by this Court that prisoners have certain
constitutional rights which can be protected by civil rights ac-
tions would be diluted if inmates, often "totally or functionally il-
literate," were unable to articulate their complaints to the
courts. 09
In Bounds v. Smith,"' the Court, relying on Avery, Wolff, and Griffin
and its progeny, concluded that "[i]t is now established beyond doubt
that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.""' The
Court stressed that inmate access to the courts must be "adequate, ef-
fective, and meaningful,""' and thus held that the Constitution requires
that the states provide prisoners with "adequate law libraries or ade-
quate assistance from persons trained in the law.""'
Avery, Wolff, and Bounds can obviously be explained on the ground
that the litigant in each case was a prisoner. The Court in Avery and in
Wolff was merely striking down prison regulations that in effect erected
barriers to inmate access to the courts. In Bounds, the Court imposed on
the state an affirmative obligation to provide prisoners with access to
law libraries - a right of access non-incarcerated persons possess.
393 U.S. 483 (1969).
' Id. at 485.
107 Id.
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
"' Id. at 579.
,, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
... Id. at 821.
Id. at 822.
" Id. at 828.
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To read these cases as requiring appointed counsel to ensure mean-
ingful access to the courts would be taking them a step beyond their
holdings,"' but this would be a logical outgrowth when considered in
light of other Supreme Court statements about the importance of
counsel.' 5 At the least, the cases support my contention that access to
the courts for purposes of protecting civil rights is as fundamental as
such access in criminal cases. I believe that the equal protection clause
should be construed to require appointed counsel for all indigent habeas
petitioners and civil rights plaintiffs who bring nonfrivolous actions."'
C. Due Process
The due process clause, which applies to both federal'"7 and state"'
governments, provides that "No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.""' 9 If a state or the
federal government implicates a protected interest, the question then
becomes, what process is due. According to the Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge,'" a due process analysis involves a balancing of
three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail."'
Applying this test to a case involving access to the courts would sug-
gest first that we examine the right that the civil litigant is attempting
to protect through a lawsuit."' A constitutional right, or one of the
rights the court deems "fundamental,""' would certainly tip the scales in
"' Such an expansive reading of Avery, Wolff, and Bounds would also be contrary to
the holding in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
"I See pp. 1267-70 supra
... See p. 1300 infra (discussion of methods for screening out frivolous claims).
1" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
,,8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
"9 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335.
A right of access to the courts is only as important as the underlying right that the
litigant is asserting. See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process
Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IOWA L. REV., 223, 263
(1970).
" The Supreme Court appears to apply a similar analysis to fundamental rights under
the equal protection and due process clauses. See id. at 245; Comment, The Heirs of Boddie:
Court Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571, 580
(1973). While it is likely that interests deemed fundamental for purposes of due process
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favor of the litigant. If the indigent plaintiff will lose the constitutional
right at stake unless he has a court-appointed lawyer to assist him in
asserting the right in court, then I believe that traditional due process
balancing would require the government to provide representation as
the process that is due. The indigent plaintiffs interest in judically
asserting his constitutional right would outweigh the government's in-
terest in preserving treasury funds and in preventing frivolous litigation
for several reasons. First, the Supreme Court has held that "the cost of
protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial."12' 4 Se-
cond, there are ways for the government to minimize the financial
burden; a recoupment scheme is one possibility," and requiring a pro
bono commitment from lawyers as a condition to admission to practice in
that court is another.12 To deal with the problem of frivolous claims, the
government could use a screening standard,21 or establish an indepen-
dent screening panel." As I pointed out in my discussion of equal protec-
tion theory, however, the critical question is not how I would resolve the
due process balancing test in such a case, but how the Supreme Court
will resolve it.
An analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of access to the courts
under the due process clause must begin with Boddie v. Connecticut.
12
The plaintiffs, who were welfare recipients, brought suit to challenge
Connecticut's requirement that a party pay filing and service of process
fees in order to institute a divorce action. The Court initially emphasized
the fundamental nature of marriage, 0 then recognized that it "has
seldom been asked to view access to the courts as an element of due pro-
cess" for plaintiffs because, while a defendant who is brought into court
has no choice but to make use of the judicial process, there are usually
would always be considered fundamental under equal protection, the reverse is not true.
,See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1130 (1969). For
example, under Griffin, access to a criminal appeal is fundamental under equal protection
analysis so that the state cannot distribute it unequally, but due process does not require
states to provide for an appeal from a criminal conviction. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
18 (1956).
12 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 816, 825 (1977).
" State legislatures could enact a recoupment statute, under which an indigent
litigant who received court-appointed counsel would have to repay the government for
counsel fees if and when he became financially able to do so. See Note, Indigents'Right to
Appointed Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 GEO. L. J. 113, 129 (1977) [hereinafter cited as In-
digents' Right].
.2. See GENERAL RULES OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Rule 3.31; text accompa-
nying notes 205-07 infra (discussion of Rule 3.31).
I2 For example, the court could refuse to appoint counsel if the plaintiff's complaint
could not survive a motion to dismiss. See text accompanying note 221 infra.
2 See Indigents' Right, supra note 125, at 129; p. 1300 infra (discussion of screening
panel alternative).
1 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
1 Id. at 376. The Boddie Court relied on, inter alia, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.
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private means of dispute settlement available to potential plaintiffs."'
Nevertheless, the Court found that the plaintiffs in Boddie were entitled
to the due process protections normally accorded defendants:
[A]lthough they assert here due process rights as would-be plain-
tiffs, we think appellants' plight, because resort to the state
courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is
akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort to
the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend
his interests in court. For both groups this process is not only
the paramount dispute-settlement technique, but, in fact, the only
available one. In this posture we think that this appeal is prop-
erly to be resolved in light of the principles enunciated in our
due process decisions that delimit the rights of defendants com-
pelled to litigate their differences in the judicial forum.132
The Court then considered the state's interests in requiring pay-
ment of fees from litigants to conserve fiscal resources and to discourage
frivolous claims, and found that these interests were insufficient to
justify denying the plaintiffs the opportunity to institute divorce ac-
tions. As to the state's financial interest, the Court applied Griffin and
stated that the state could not "interpose the costs as a measure of
allocating its judicial resources.""' Regarding the problem of frivolous
litigation, the Court noted that less restrictive alternatives, including
penalties for false pleadings, and suits for malicious prosecution or abuse
of process, were available to the state."'
In 1971, one year after the decision in Boddie, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in a number of cases in which indigents alleged that
their states had denied them access to civil courts because of their in-
ability to pay filing fees or penalty bonds, or because of the denial of
court-appointed counsel. 3 ' Justice Black, dissenting from the denial of
certiorari in one case, argued that Boddie should not be limited to its
facts. "In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safely rest
on only one crucial foundation-that the civil courts of the United States
and each of the States belong to the people of this country and that no
person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an ap-
peal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or af-
401 U.S. at 375-76.
' Id. at 376-77.
"' Id. at 382.
13 Id. at 381-82.
"3 See Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 955 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
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ford to hire an attorney." '38 Justice Black pointed out what seems ob-
vious to me, that the judicial process is "the ultimate power of enforce-
ment in almost every dispute.'3 7 Justice Brennan had made the same
point in his concurring opinion in Boddie: "A State has an ultimate
monopoly of all judicial process and attendant enforcement machinery.
As a practical matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled between
the parties, the court system is usually 'the only forum effectively em-
powered to settle their disputes.'
Regarding the effect of Boddie on the right to court-appointed
counsel in civil cases, Justice Black later wrote:
[T]here cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process until
every serious litigant is represented by competent counsel ....
Of course, not every litigant would be entitled to appointed
counsel no matter how frivolous his claims might be .... But the
fundamental importance of legal representation in our system of
adversary justice is beyond dispute. Since Boddie held that
there must be meaningful access to civil courts in divorce cases,
I can only conclude that Boddie necessitates the appointment of
counsel for indigents in such cases. 3 '
The majority in Boddie, although holding that Connecticut's fee re-
quirements violated the due process clause, expressly limited its holding
to the facts of that case. "We do not decide that access for all individuals
to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause . . .. ,"Io As confirmed by subsequent decisions, for
due process to require equal access to the courts, the balance of the
three Mathews v. Eldridge factors must be struck in favor of the
litigant, as it was in Boddie: the right at issue must be a constitutional
right or a right deemed fundamental by the Court, and the litigant must
be threatened with loss of the right without the due process protections.
In other words, access to the courts must be the only means available for
the litigarit to protect his fundamental rights.
In United States v. Kras,"' the Court refused to extend Boddie to a
challenge of the fee requirement for bankruptcy petitions. The Court
found that neither of the determinative factors in Boddie was present in
' Id. at 955-56. Justice Black apparently changed his mind about Boddie by the time
he wrote his Meltzer dissent. He had dissented in Boddie, arguing that civil litigants are en-
titled to much less constitutional protection than criminal defendants and concluding that
"[t]here is ... no reason why government should in civil trials be hampered or handicapped
by the strict and rigid due process rules the Constitution has provided to protect people
charged with crime." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 391 (Black, J., dissenting).
,37 402 U.S. at 956.
'' 401 U.S. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 376).
's 402 U.S. at 959 (citations omitted).
... 401 U.S. at 382.
14, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
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Kras. First, the Court held that a discharge in bankruptcy was not a con-
stitutional or fundamental right:
Kras' alleged interest in the elimination of his debt burden, and
in obtaining his desired new start in life, .although important and
so recognized by the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, does not
rise to the same constitutional level [as marriage] .... If Kras is
not discharged in bankruptcy, his position will not be materially
altered in any constitutional sense. Gaining or not gaining a
discharge will effect no change with respect to basic necessities.
We see no fundamental interest that is gained or lost depending
on the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy. '42
Second, the Court found that unlike Boddie, there were alternative
private means for the debtor to resolve his problems with his creditors.
Although the majority recognized that in some cases a private solution
may be "unrealistic," the Justices said that at least in theory, "a debtor
... may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors."'4
In Ortwein v. Schwab,'" the Court again refused to extend Boddie
beyond its facts. The plaintiffs in Schwab were seeking appellate review
of decisions by the state welfare agency to reduce their welfare benefits,
and they alleged that they were unable to pay the $25.00 filing fee re-
quired by the state court. The Court found that the plaintiffs' interest in
getting the reduced benefits reinstated was not a fundamental interest
and emphasized that they had already received an agency hearing on the
merits of their claim.'
The Supreme Court provided another indication of its current swing
away from expanding due process rights for indigents in Ross v.
14. Id. at 445 (citations omitted).
"I Id. The majority's finding that a debtor has alternatives to a discharge in bankruptcy
provoked a vigorous dissent from Justice Stewart, who was joined by Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall. Justice Stewart argued that a discharge in bankruptcy was, like
divorce, the only means available to resolve the dispute and was controlled by the courts.
He contended that a court-imposed bankruptcy discharge was even more important when
the debtor is indigent:
While the creditors of a bankrupt with assets might well desire to reach a com-
promise settlement, that possibility is foreclosed to the truly indigent bankrupt.
With no funds . . ., the assetless bankrupt has absolutely nothing to offer his
creditors. And his creditors have nothing to gain by allowing him to escape or
reduce his debts; their only hope is that eventually he might make enough income
for them to attach. Unless the government provides him access to the bankruptcy
court, Kras will remain in the totally hopeless situation he now finds himself. The
government has thus truly pre-empted the only means for the indigent bankrupt
to get out from under a lifetime burden of debt.
Id. at 455-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
.. 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
..5 Id. at 659-60.
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Moffitt.'" In holding that due process did not require a state to appoint
counsel for an indigent who is seeking a discretionary appeal, Justice
Rehnquist relied on the distinction between a criminal defendant on trial
and one trying to attack his conviction on appeal:
[Unlike criminal trials,] it is ordinarily the defendant, rather than
the State, who initiates the appellate process, seeking not to
fend off the efforts of the State's prosecutor but rather to over-
turn a finding of guilt made by a judge or jury below. The defen-
dant needs an attorney on appeal not as a shield to protect him
against being "haled into court" by the State and stripped of his
presumption of innocence, but rather as a sword to upset the
prior determination of guilt.
4 7
Perhaps it is not surprising that the Court chose not to extend the
rationale of Boddie, but it is surprising that some of the subsequent deci-
sions demonstrated such insensitivity to the plight of the poor. For ex-
ample, the majority opinion in Kras noted that the litigant could pay the
$50.00 bankruptcy filing fee in installments over a six-month period,
which would require a weekly payment of $1.92, and could extend
payments beyond the six-month period for an additional three months,
thus lowering the weekly payment to $1.28.46 The Court found that if the
debtor "really needs and desires that discharge, this much available
revenue should be within his able-bodied reach when the adjudication in
bankruptcy has stayed collection and has brought to a halt whatever
harassment, if any, he may have sustained from creditors."4 As Justice
Marshall said so eloquently in his dissent:
It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings
of less than $2 are no burden. But no one who has had close con-
tact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the
margin of survival many of them are. A sudden illness, for exam-
ple, may destroy whatever savings they may have accumulated,
and by eliminating a sense of security may destroy the incentive
to save in the future. A pack or two of cigarettes may be, for
them, not a routine purchase but a luxury indulged in only rarely.
The desperately poor almost never go to see a movie, which the
majority seems to believe is almost weekly activity. They have
more important things to do with what little money tiey
"1 417 U.S. 600 (1974); see text accompanying notes 98-99 supra (discussion of Ross in
context of equal protection clause).
It 417 U.S. at 610-11.
' 409 U.S. 434, 449 (1973); see text accompanying notes 141-43 supra (discussion of
Kras).
409 U.S. at 449.
" Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
12871982]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA WREVIEW
have-like attempting to provide some comforts for a gravely ill
child, as Kras must do.
It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what the
Constitution requires. But it is disgraceful for an interpretation
of the Constitution to be premised upon unfounded assumptions
about how people live."'
My purpose in pointing out this insensitivity to the conditions of
many of the poor is to suggest that it may be a factor in some of the
Supreme Court decisions cutting back on the protections given to in-
digents under both the due process and equal protection clauses. The
overt class bias in the majority opinion in Kras may have also been a
subtle influence on the Court in Ross and Schwab. Realistically, the
chances are slim that the Supreme Court will ever hold that either the
equal protection or the due process clause requires that indigent civil
litigants receive court-appointed counsel given the subtle and not-so-
subtle influences of class bias or ignorance of the situation of poverty.
III. THE CURRENT PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Civil Rights Cases
In 1892, Congress enacted a statute that not only authorized poor
persons to bring suits in forma pauperis, but also contained a provision
allowing federal courts to request attorneys to represent poor
litigants.'' The current statute, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915, pro-
vides in part:
The court may request an attorney to represent any such
person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the
allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is
frivolous or malicious. 52
1. Case Law
In considering the scope of section 1915, the federal courts have con-
sistently held that court-appointed counsel is "a privilege and not a
"' Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1979)).
2 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1979). The original codification of the section that is now §
1915(d) contained similar language:
That the court may request any attorney of the court to represent such poor
person, if it deems the cause worthy of a trial, and may dismiss any such cause so
brought under this act if it be. made to appear that the allegation of poverty is un-
true, or if said court be satisfied that the alleged cause of action is frivolous or
malicious.
Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 4, 27 Stat. 252. Originally, the Act applied only to civil cases,
but in 1910 it was amended to apply to civil or criminal actions. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 435,
§ 1, 36 Stat. 86Q.
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right,"'' 3 and that the decision whether or not to appoint counsel is
within the broad discretion of the district court.'54 Many of the circuit
courts have held that the district courts should appoint counsel for pro
se civil plaintiffs only in "exceptional circumstances.""' It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that in most cases the courts of appeals have refused to
find that a district court abused its discretion in denying an indigent
plaintiffs motion for appointment of counsel. 5 Nevertheless, some cir-
cuits have attempted to set out standards to guide the district courts in
determining whether to appoint counsel under section 1915.
In Gordon v. Leeke,"7 a prisoner brought a section 1983 action
against the warden seeking damages for the loss of a watch allegedly
stolen during a shakedown. In reversing the district court's dismissal of
the plaintiff's pro se complaint, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[i]f it is
apparent to the district court that a pro se litigant has a colorable claim
but lacks the capacity to present it, the district court should appoint
counsel to assist him."1 8
In Maclin v. Freake,'"5 a case in which I sat on the panel, the plaintiff,
a state prisoner who was a paraplegic, appealed from the district court's
dismissal of his coinplaint alleging that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. The district court also had denied the
"4 United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965).
"4 See id.; United States v. McQuade, 579 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied,
102 S. Ct. 1470 (1982); Alexander v. Ramsey, 539 F.2d 25, 26 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201, 1203 (4th Cir. 1971); Hudson v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091,
1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 761 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 393 U.S.
891 (1968); Saylor v. United States Bd. of Parole, 345 F.2d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Alexander v.
Ramsey, 539 F.2d 25, 26 (9th Cir. 1975); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1975);
United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 1965).
'" Randall v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 304, 307 n.6 (8th Cir. 1981); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d
1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Hudak v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 586
F.2d 105, 107 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); Cook v. Bounds, 518 F.2d 779,
780 (4th Cir. 1975); Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1968). If, however, the
district court denied the request for appointed counsel under the mistaken belief that it
lacked power to do so, the courts of appeals uniformly have reversed and remanded to the
trial court to reconsider in light of section 1915. See Ray v. Robinson, 640 F.2d 474, 477-78
(3d Cir. 1981); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Blackledge, 451
F.2d 1201, 1203 (4th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 794
(9th Cir. 1965).
The Supreme Court has never enunciated standards for the courts to apply in ruling on
a motion for appointed counsel under section 1915(d). But Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, has recognized that "[q]uestions concerning the standards
by which district courts are to exercise their discretion in appointing counsel under §
1915(d), and the degree to which the exercise of that discretion is to be controlled, are of. ob-
vious importance to the administration of justice, and to the enforcement of federal civil
rights, particularly in our Nation's penal institutions." Hyman v. Rickman, 446 U.S. 989, 992
(1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
17 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
"4 Id. at 1153.
" 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
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plaintiff's request for court-appointed counsel. Although the Seventh
Circuit recognized that "the district court has broad discretion to ap-
point counsel for indigents under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), and its denial of
counsel will not be overturned unless it would result in fundamental un-
fairness impinging on due process rights,"'6 0 the court went on to enun-
ciate four factors the district court should take into account in ruling on
a motion for appointment of counsel. First, the claim must have "'some
merit in fact and law.' "161 Second, the court should consider the nature of
the factual issues involved."2 When the indigent is unable to investigate
the facts,'63 as, for example, when the plaintiff is incarcerated or when
critical evidentiary issues will involve conflicting testimony,' then the
district court should probably appoint counsel. Third, the court should
consider the ability of the litigant to represent himself. 6' Fourth, the
court should consider the complexity of the legal issues; "where the law
is not clear, it will often best serve the ends of justice to have both sides
... presented by those trained in legal analysis."'66
Applying those factors in Maclin, we concluded that the district
judge erred in denying the plaintiffs motion to appoint counsel. The
plaintiff was incarcerated and was confined to a wheelchair. Further, the
plaintiff's initial attempts at litigating pro se in the district court
demonstrated his inability to proceed without the assistance of counsel.
We therefore remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to appoint counsel.'67
In Hudson v. Hardy,'68 a prisoner brought an action for declaratory
judgment, alleging cruel and inhuman treatment by prison officials. The
district court granted the defendant's motion for dismissal or, in the
alternative, summary judgment, and the court of appeals reversed and
remanded. In dicta, the court discussed the problems faced by inmates
attempting to litigate pro se:
It may be that, even if apprised of the need for a factual response
to [defendant's] summary judgment motion, [plaintiff] would have
lacked sufficient access to sources of proof, understanding of the
legal issues involved, or ability to express himself to
demonstrate the existence of a question of material fact. In a pro-
Id. at 886.
Id. at 887 (quoting Spears v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 22, 25 (S.D.W.Va. 1967)).
162 650 F.2d at 887.
163 Id.
Id. at 888.
" Id. The Maclin court cited as an example Hudak v. Curators of the University of
Missouri, 586 F.2d 105, 106 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979), in which the
Eighth Circuit upheld the denial of a request for counsel by a litigant who was a former law
professor. 650 F.2d at 888.
1 650 F.2d at 889.
167 Id.
" 412 F.2d 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
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ceeding of this kind, the District Court has discretion with
respect to appointment of counsel, and we do not suggest that
the initial denial of [plaintiff's] motion for counsel constituted an
abuse of that discretion. An indigent prisoner, however, may be
more greatly disadvantaged by the absence of legal assistance
when he is called upon to resist a motion for summary judgment
than might otherwise have been the case. When necessary to in-
sure that an indigent prisoner's allegations receive fair con-
sideration, the court's plain duty is to appoint counsel to assist
him in defending the motion for summary judgment.16
In Shields v. Jackson,70 the Eighth Circuit directed the district court
to appoint counsel for an indigent inmate in a section 1983 suit. The
court stated: "We take this action because it is clear that Shields is in-
digent and not in a position to adequately investigate the case, and
because we believe that the complaint states a cause of action and that
the appointment of counsel will advance the proper administration of
justice."''
2. Survey of the Federal'Courts
As part of the research for this article, I wrote to the clerks of all the
circuit courts of appeals' and ninety of the district courts' to inquire
what their practices were regarding appointment of attorneys for in-
digent plaintiffs in civil rights cases and indigent petitioners in habeas
corpus cases."" I received responses from all of the circuit courts and
from seventy-two out of ninety district courts.
Two of the circuit courts have formal rules dealing with appointment
of counsel in civil cases. The Judicial Conference of the Tenth Circuit has
adopted a plan to provide counsel for litigants in certain cases. The plan
requires that the litigant request appointment of counsel and be finan-
cially unable to retain a lawyer. In addition, the case must "present com-
plex and significant legal issues, the outcome of which may have wide
impact." The plan also requires that the appointment of counsel be
"6necessary for the effective presentation of the issues to the Court" and
in the interests of justice. The most remarkable feature of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's plan is that it provides for compensation of attorneys up to $500,
"I Id. at 1095 (footnotes omitted).
110 570 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
71 Id. at 286. See also Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971) (also ordering
district court to appoint counsel for indigent prisoner).
17 The circuit court survey did not include the Eleventh Circuit, which had not been
formed at the time my letters were sent.
17 This group included all of the districts in the continental United States plus those in
Alaska and Hawaii.
"' For the results of the survey pertaining to habeas corpus procedures, see p. 1296
infra.
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and reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses from the court's trust
fund.
17 5
The Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals states only that counsel will generally
not be provided for indigent civil litigants, but that the court may refer a
party to a legal aid clinic, law school clinic, or a private attorney willing
to take such a case.
The Fifth Circuit has written guidelines for staff attorneys to follow
in making recommendations to the court on motions for the appointment
of counsel for indigent civil parties. It is the Fifth Circuit's policy to ap-
point counsel whenever the litigant is incarcerated if the case is set for
oral argument. When the litigant is not a prisoner, the court will appoint
counsel when "the appointment will meaningfully assist [the] Court in
resolving the appeal," but counsel will not be appointed "[i]f the issues
raised . . . may be readily resolved from the record and applicable case
law."
In the Eighth Circuit, an administrative panel reviews motions for
appointment of counsel in civil rights cases and makes recommendations
to the court. The court maintains a fund to reimburse the attorneys who
accept such appointments for their out-of-pocket expenses.
Four of the other circuits do not have formal procedures governing
motions for appointment of counsel in civil cases but do maintain lists of
local attorneys who have expressed a willingness to take these cases on
a pro bono basis.
Only one of the district courts that responded to my letter has any
formal guidelines regarding court-appointed counsel for indigents in civil
rights cases. Most district courts do not have any standards to guide a
judge ruling on such a motion, and the standards or policies given by the
other district courts varied greatly. '76 The standards ranged from "only
when the case is going to trial" to any case in which the plaintiff is in-
digent and the case "warrants appointment of counsel" or the complaint
presents a "colorable" claim. Some courts considered the complexity of
the case, whether it presented "serious constitutional issues" or
"substantial issues of law," the plaintiffs ability to investigate the facts
and research the law, and the likelihood of success on the merits. In one
district, the court will appoint counsel if the case survives a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
Six courts required that the plaintiff attempt to get an attorney
either on a contingent-fee basis or from a legal aid clinic. In four
districts, the courts will not appoint counsel for indigents in civil cases
175 See text accompanying notes 208-13 infra on the problems with requiring lawyers to
serve without compensation.
'1, The clerk of one district court responded that in his court the practice varied depend-
ing upon the judge ruling on the motion; one judge often appointed counsel for indigents in
civil rights cases, but the other judges never did.
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but will refer the parties to private attorneys. In addition to those four
courts, three other courts stated that they never appoint counsel in a
civil case, and seven more districts said that such appointments were
very rare. In one-fourth of the districts, a magistrate reviews motions
for appointment of counsel. The rest of the districts either failed to
specify how these motions were handled or said that they were reviewed
by a judge.
Several of the clerks or judges who responded to my letter indicated
that it was often difficult and sometimes impossible to find attorneys
willing to take civil rights cases on a pro bono basis. In fourteen of the
districts, when the judge wants to appoint counsel either he, the
magistrate, or the clerk will contact attorneys informally and ask them
to accept an appointment. Fourteen courts maintain a list of attorneys
willing to take civil rights cases on a pro bono or possibly a contingent-
fee basis, and three other districts are attempting to put such a list
together. These lists are usually prepared by the courts but in a few
districts the local bar associations are involved. Three courts said that
they use the list of lawyers prepared for appointments in criminal cases
under the Criminal Justice Act.
7 7
The Eastern District of New York was the only one of the responding
district courts that has formal procedures for the appointment of counsel
under section 1915(d). The plan, only recently developed, came about
substantially due to the efforts of Chief Judge Jack Weinstein. 178 Under
the new rules, the clerk of the court will maintain a list of attorneys will-
ing to accept appointments on a pro bono basis. The clerk will inform all
pro se litigants who file in forma pauperis affidavits of the opportunity
to apply for court-appointed counsel and will assist them in completing
the application form. The rules specify four factors to be considered by
the judge in ruling on a litigant's application:
(i) the nature and complexity of the action; (ii) the potential merit
of the claims as set forth in the pleadings; (iii) the inability of the
pro se party to retain counsel by other means; (iv) the degree to
which the interests of justice will be served by appointment of
counsel, including the benefit the court may derive from the
assistance of the appointed counsel ....
The rules also contain provisions relating to the responsibilities of
an attorney appointed by the court. These provisions set out the at-
torney's duties in the lawyer-client relationship and in the attorney's
relationship to the court. In addition, the rules specify certain grounds
" See text accozhpanying notes 187-90 infra.
17 Judge Weinstein has long been a forceful proponent for finding a solution for the
problem of the poor civil litigant and has written eloquently on the subject. See, e.g.,
Chubbs v. City of New York, 324 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Weinstein, supra
note 2, passim.
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on which the court may relieve the attorney from the appointment.
Finally, the plan provides for limited reimbursement for out-of-pocket
expenses from a non-profit corporation set up for that purpose, the
Eastern District Civil Litigation Fund, Inc.
The Northern District of Illinois has taken another approach in at-
tempting to meet the need for counsel for indigent litigants in civil
cases. In its new rules, the court has required that "every member of the
trial bar 7' shall be available for appointment by the court to represent
or assist in the representation of those who cannot afford to hire a
member of the trial bar."'80 The rules provide, however, that no attorney
be required to accept more than one appointment per year.8 '
B. Habeas Corpus Cases
A prisoner convicted in a state court may file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, 18 which is a civil action."' Prisoners convicted in federal
court must move for relief from the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255;
habeas corpus relief is still available, however, if relief under section
2255 would be inadequate."4 The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal
Rules Governing Procedures Under Section 2255 characterize the mo-
tion as "a further step in the movant's criminal case and not a separate
civil action,"' 85 but the courts have held that a 2255 motion is an indepen-
dent civil suit.86
Despite the label "civil," appointment of counsel for habeas peti-
tioners differs from that of civil litigants in two important respects.
First, the Criminal Justice Act was amended in 1970... to permit the
discretionary appointment of counsel in habeas cases "whenever the
United States magistrate or the court determines that the interests of
justice so require and such person is financially unable to obtain
representation.""' The Act now authorizes, payment for appointed
'' Attorneys who are admitted to practice in the Northern District of Illinois may not
appear in trials or other testimonial proceedings unless they are members of the court's
trial bar or are appearing in association with a trial bar member. GENERAL RULES OF THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Rule 3.10. (Rule 3.10 will become effective on Jan. 3, 1983).
"I GENERAL RULES OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Rule 3.31. (Rule 3.31 became
effective on Oct. 4, 1982).
"' Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
' See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293 (1969).
', 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
" RULES GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS UNDER SEC-
TION 2255 OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, Rule 1, Advisory Committee Note.
'M United States v. Somers, 552 F.2d 108, 110 n.6 (3d Cir. 1977); Ferrara v. United
States, 547 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1977); Neely v. United States, 546 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir.
1976) (dictum).
Pub. L. No. 91-447, § 1(a), 84 Stat. 916 (1970).
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1976). As the advisory committee notes. to the rules governing
section 2254 cases point out, "the standards of indigency under this section [of the Criminal
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counsel in post-conviction proceedings up to a maximum of $250,189 and
the maximum may be waived by the court if the case required "extended
or complex representation.'19O
Second, the rules governing habeas procedures in federal courts for
both federal and state prisoners provide that "[i]f an evidentiary hearing
is required, the judge shall appoint counsel for a movant who qualifies
for the appointment of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)."19 The rules
provide, however, that a court still retains discretion to appoint counsel
at an earlier stage in the case.
192
1. Case Law
As in civil cases, the district court has discretion in deciding
whether to appoint counsel in habeas proceedings, and most courts of ap-
peals have refused to find that a district court abused its discretion in
denying a petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel. 93 A few courts
have attempted to provide some guidelines for the district courts in ex-
ercising their discretion to appoint counsel for indigent petitioners. The
Fifth Circuit has held that the district court must appoint counsel for an
Justice Act] are less strict than those regarding eligibility to prosecute a petition informa
pauperis, and thus many who cannot qualify to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 will be entitled
to the benefits of counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)." RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, Rule 8, Advisory Committee Note.
' 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2) (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(3) (1976). Section 3006A avoids the potential problems requiring
attorneys to serve without compensation would present. See text accompanying notes
208-13 infra.
"I RULES GOVERNING PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS UNDER SEC-
TION 2255 OF TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, Rule 8(c); RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254
CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, Rule 8(c).
I" Id. The Advisory Committee Notes to the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state
that:
If an evidentiary hearing is required the judge must appoint counsel for a
petitioner who qualified for appointment under the Criminal Justice Act. Currently,
the appointment of counsel is not recognized as a right at any stage of a habeas
proceeding .... Some district courts have, however, by local rule, required that
counsel must be provided for indigent petitioners in cases requiring a hearing....
Appointment of counsel at this state is [now] mandatory under subdivision (c).
This requirement will not limit the authority of the court to provide counsel at an
earlier stage if it is thought desirable to do so as is done in some courts under cur-
rent practice. At the evidentiary hearing stage, however, an indigent petitioner's
access to counsel should not depend on local practice and, for this reason, the fur-
nishing of counsel is made mandatory.
RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, Rule 8, Ad-
visory Committee Note.
'" See, e.g., Williams v. State of Missouri, 640 F.2d 140, 144 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 990 (1982) (§ 2254); United States v. Degand, 614 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir.
1980) (§ 2255); United States ex rel. Cadogan v. LaValiee, 502 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir. 1974) (§
2254). But see Souder v. McGuire, 516 F.2d 820, 821 (d Cir. 1975).
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indigent habeas corpus petitioner if due process so requires;'94 "fun-
damental fairness is the test," according to the court."' The Ninth Cir-
cuit has suggested that it would be "desirable" for a district court to ap-
point counsel where the petition presents complicated and important
constitutional issues.'96
2. Survey Results
All of the courts responding to my letter maintained a panel of
lawyers under the Criminal Justice Act for appointment in habeas cor-
pus cases. In cases not requiring an evidentiary hearing, in which ap-
pointment of counsel is discretionary, most courts said that their stan-
dard for ruling on motions to appoint counsel was whenever "the in-
terests of justice so require."'97 Only a few courts went beyond the
statutory standard in setting policies for discretionary appointments in
habeas corpus cases.
The District of Columbia Circuit applies the standard for criminal
defendants in appointing counsel for indigent petitioners who were
denied habeas corpus relief in the district court. The court should ap-
point counsel "if the possibility of a meritorious claim exists." In the
Eighth Circuit, the district courts routinely appoint counsel for an in-
digent petitioner if the court certifies that the petitioner filed the appeal
in good faith.
In the District of South Carolina, when the court must analyze a
.-voluminous record to determine the existence of a valid federal claim,
the court will appoint counsel to review the record. The magistrate for
the District of Nebraska stated that he appoints counsel for an indigent
habeas corpus petitioner unless the petitioner has failed to exhaust his
state court remedies. In the Western District of Tennessee, the
magistrates usually recommend that the court appoint counsel if they
determine that the petition raises a "substantial issue."
A few districts reported some difficulty in finding attorneys to
represent habeas corpus petitioners, at least in part due to the belief of
some attorneys that the compensation payable under the Criminal
Justice Act is inadequate.
IV. How BEST TO MEET THE LEGAL NEEDS OF INDIGENT
CIVIL LITIGANTS
Some commentators have suggested that in civil cases indigent
plaintiffs with meritorious claims can secure representation through a
"' Norris v. Wainwright, 588 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 846 (1979).
15 Id. at 134.
18 Williams v. Craven, 460 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1972).
"9 The "interests of justice" standard is enunciated in the Criminal Justice Act, 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(g) (1976), quoted in text accompanying note 188 supra.
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contingent-fee arrangement with a private attorney. '98 In addition, the
prevailing party in a section 1983 action is entitled to recover attorney's
fees. '99 An important finding of my federal court survey, however, is that
the marketplace does not always operate to meet the needs of poor
litigants in civil rights and habeas corpus proceedings. Most of the
courts reported that in some cases the judges or magistrates have had to
seek counsel for indigent civil litigants with meritorious or colorable
claims.
In addition, the suggestion that contingent-fee arrangements could
provide representation for more than a small percentage of civil litigants
is unworkable for several reasons. First, many litigants, especially in
prisoner civil rights suits, will be seeking injunctive or declaratory
relief.29 Second, even if the plaintiff is asking for damages, the amount of
money involved may be too small to interest a private attorney to take
the case for a contingent fee.20' Finally, many indigent litigants, most
notably prisoners, lack any real access to lawyers and therefore would
have difficulty in securing representation on a contingent-fee basis even
with a meritorious claim for a substantial amount of damages.
If the Supreme Court would find that there is a constitutional right
to counsel for indigent civil litigants, then it would be up to Congress
and the state legislatures to appropriate the necessary funds. Since, as I
have noted previously, such a declaration from the Court is unlikely,'2 2 I
will discuss some of the many ideas put forth by lawyers, legislators, and
others concerning how best to provide legal services to the poor.
A. Requiring Pro Bono Work from Lawyers
One plan proposed by the local bar association in New York City
would make pro bono work a mandatory obligation of every lawyer by
putting such a duty in the Disciplinary Rules of the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. 3 Under the New
York proposal, the Code's system of disciplinary processes and sanctions
would enforce the pro bono obligation. The ABA, however, has con-
tinued to reject such an approach. As stated in the notes to the proposed
1' See Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1324-25
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Right to Counsel]. See also Kraut, Contingent Fee: Champerty
or Champion?, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 15, 26 (1972) ("The contingent fee system has allowed
persons, who otherwise could not afford a lawsuit, to assert their claims and have their day
in court.").
1" 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
Of course, the provision for attorney fees in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 would also apply to a
prevailing party awarded declaratory or injunctive relief.
"' See Indigents'Right, supra note 125, at 116.
See p. 1288 supra.
See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TOWARD A MANDATORY CON-
TRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER: RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAWYER'S PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS 1, 7 (1979), [hereinafter
cited as NEW YORK BAR RECOMMENDATIONS].
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revisions of the Code, the proposed rule concerning pro bono service
"continues the nonobligatory professional standard set forth in the cur-
rent Code."20
Another method of imposing a duty to perform pro bono work on all
lawyers is to make acceptance of public interest representation a condi-
tion of admission to practice in a jurisdiction. The Northern District of Il-
linois has adopted such a plan,0 5 but the pro bono commitment is re-
quired only of attorneys who participate in trials or trial-like pro-
ceedings. 0 Each trial lawyer practicing in that court must be available
for appointment by the court to one case per year.0 7
A mandatory pro bono commitment, however, raises serious con-
stitutional questions.00 Some courts have held that requiring attorneys
to provide uncompensated legal services is a taking of property in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment. 9 Recently, a district court refused to ap-
point counsel on the ground that such an appointment would violate the
thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.210
Other courts have rejected these constitutional challenges on the theory
that the duty to accept court appointments is a permissible condition of
a license to practice law.'
Beyond any possible constitutional infirmities, an additional
criticism of requiring attorneys to serve without compensation is that
the requirement is unfair to lawyers as a group:
' See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 180 (Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL RULES]. The proposed Rule 6.1 provides:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge
this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to
persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organiza-
tions, or by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the
legal profession.
Id.
20 See GENERAL RULES OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Rule 3.31; text accompa-
nying notes 179-81 supra.
See GENERAL RULES OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Rule 3.10.
See GENERAL RULES OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Rule 3.31.
See generally Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitu-
tionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Court Appointment].
See, e.g., Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964), rev'd, 346 F.2d 633
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); Bedford v. Salt Lake City, 22 Utah 2d 12,
447 P.2d 193 (1968).
210 In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel, 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala.
1979).
"I See, e.g., Dolan v. United States, 351 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966). See also Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) ("Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to
render service when required by such an appointment."); Court Appointment, supra note
208, at 390 (concluding that court appointment of counsel is not unconstitutional); NEW YORK
BAR RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 203, at 30-32. But see MODEL RULES, supra note 204, at




It is unfair to put on any working group the burden of providing
for the needy out of its stock in trade. No one would suggest that
the individual grocer or builder should take the responsibility of
providing the food and shelter needed by the poor. The same
conclusion applies to the lawyer. The lawyer's stock in trade is
intangible-his time fortified by his intellectual and personal
qualities, and burdened by his office expenses. To take his stock
in trade is like stripping the shelves of the grocer or taking over
a subdivision of the builder.2 '
The answer to this criticism, as stated by a committee of the New York
City Bar Association, is: "We do not mean to suggest that the legal pro-
fession alone bears the responsibility for, or has resources adequate to
satisfy, the needs for legal services and reform of justice in our society.
What we do assert is that every member of the profession, as a profes-
sional and as an officer of the law, has a unique responsibility and oppor-
tunity to make some contribution to the satisfaction of such needs."2 '
B. Expanding Government-Funded Legal Services Programs
Another method of providing legal assistance to the poor would be
through a government-sponsored legal aid system, such as the one
adopted by Great Britain."4 The British system, enacted by the Parlia-
ment in 1949, is administered by the Law Society rather than by a
government agency and covers not only representation in courts but
also legal advice." 5 Sources of revenue to fund the system include taxes,
costs awarded in successful cases, and contributions from the clients.21
Raising revenues to fund legal assistance programs in the United
States could be accomplished without raising taxes. One possibility
would be to increase the filing fee for the commencement of an action in
the federal courts. The courts could use the money generated by such an
increase to provide limited compensation and reimbursement for out-of-
pocket expenses for court-appointed lawyers. A similar plan, although on
a smaller scale, is in operation now in the Tenth Circuit. ' Given the cur-
rent trend in government-funded legal assistance programs, as evidenced
on the national level by the funding cuts for the Legal Services Corpora-
tion,28 it is unlikely that there will be any proposal made to increase
government support for legal aid to the poor in the near future.
212 Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual
Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 438, 444 (1965).
213 NEW YORK BAR RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 203, at 9 (emphasis in original).
214 See generally Upton, supra note 41.
Ill Id. at 371.
218 Id. at 377.
2117 See pp. 1291-92 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
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C. Voluntary Efforts Organized by the Bar
Beyond merely promulgating ethical standards suggesting that
lawyers take on pro bono work, bar associations could actively cooperate
with the courts in facilitating an organized voluntary system in coopera-
tion with the courts. A few of the district courts I surveyed reported
that local bar associations prepared or maintained the list of attorneys
that the courts used in appointing counsel.219
To learn the status of current efforts by the organized bar, I wrote
to the presidents of the bar associations of the fifty states and Puerto
Rico, asking whether their groups made any attempt to encourage their
members to accept pro bono work."' Of the thirty-three bar association
presidents who responded, only two reported that their groups operated
a pro bono program. In Maryland, the state bar association has established
the Maryland Volunteer Lawyers Service, Inc. In Puerto Rico, the bar
operates a referral system for pro bono cases. Two other state bar
associations provide the courts with a list of attorneys willing to accept
court appointments on a pro bono basis.
It is clear, therefore, that the current efforts of the organized bar
are inadequate to marshall the resources of lawyers who are willing to
fulfill their ethical obligations by providing free legal assistance for the
poor. State and local bar associations could make a significant contribu-
tion toward meeting the legal needs of the poor by cooperating with the
courts to set up voluntary pro bono programs. In addition, bar associa-
tions could reduce the burden on the courts by assisting in the ad-
ministration of such programs.
A problem that will be encountered regardless of the method chosen
to provide increased access to legal services for the poor will be screen-
ing out frivolous cases. Currently, the burden of screening prior to a
decision on court-appointed counsel generally falls on the judges,
magistrates, or staff attorneys of the courts. Another alternative would
be a screening panel, perhaps made up of a judge or magistrate and
several private attorneys, that would make recommendations to the
court. Screening could also be handled without adding to the
bureaucracy by assigning every case in which the indigent litigant re-
quested court-appointed counsel to a private attorney for initial screen-
ing. The attorney could then present written recommendations to the
court.
A de facto screening device might further reduce administrative
burdens. Courts might refuse to appoint counsel unless the litigant's pro
se complaint or petition survived a motion to dismiss. Such a system
poses other problems, however. It might be difficult for pro se litigants
219 See p. 1293 supra.




to frame their allegations in a manner that would allow the court effec-
tively to review the merits of the claim. In addition, reviewing pro se
complaints is quite a task for the court."'
V. CONCLUSION
The right of access to courts is of fundamental importance in our
society, and the exercise of that right should not depend upon the
litigant's wealth. To ensure that indigent litigants receive a meaningful
opportunity to be heard in court will in many cases require that the
litigant have legal representation. The due process balancing test would
allow courts to decide on a case-by-case basis whether a litigant needs
representation in order to protect or assert a right.
I have argued that at least in cases involving constitutional or fun-
damental civil rights, indigent plaintiffs and habeas corpus petitioners
should have a right to court-appointed counsel. I recognize that the great
majority of indigents' legal problems do not rise to the level of a con-
stitutional issue,' and I do not demean the importance of these other
legal needs by not advocating a broad right to counsel for indigents in all
cases. Perhaps such a broad solution to the problem is down the road. In
the meantime, I believe that the federal courts should ensure meaningful
access to the courts for litigants asserting violations of constitutional or
fundamental rights.
In order to meet the need for lawyer's time that would be created by
guaranteeing the right to counsel for indigents in these cases, I have
discussed several alternatives. At the least, it would seem that the
organized bar, in cooperation with the courts, could take a more affir-
mative role in the attempt to bring the needed legal resources to in-
digent litigants. I believe that there are enough lawyers to share the
responsibility for meeting the ethical obligations of the bar to provide
legal assistance to the poor.' 23
See The Indigent's Right to Counsel, supra note 16, at 561-62 (on screening).
See Right to Counsel, supra note 198, at 1323.
Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 n.7 (1972).
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